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This paper  examines  whether  differences  in individual  risk  attitudes  are  related  to inter-
personal  conﬂict.  In more  than  thirty  villages  of  rural  Uganda,  we  conduct  a social  survey
to document  social  links  between  pairs  of  individuals  within  a  village,  and  separately  elicit
individual  risk  attitudes  using  an  incentivized  task.  Our  ﬁndings  reveal  that  the  difference  in
risk attitudes  between  two  individuals  is  signiﬁcantly  and  positively  related  to  the  presence
of  interpersonal  conﬂict  between  them.  This  relationship  is  particularly  strong  among  kin.
By contrast,  the  strength  of risk  aversion  per  se is not  related  to conﬂict.  Further,  we con-
duct  simulations  that  suggest  that  the  relationship  cannot  be  solely  explained  by diverging
attitudes  after  the severing  of  social  ties as a result  of interpersonal  conﬂict.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Conﬂict is pervasive in many different kinds of groups, ranging from small and large societies to organizations and teams
(Simmel, 1955; Coser, 1998). Conﬂict, both violent and non-violent has very harmful economic effects. Opportunities to
trade or invest are forgone when two parties cannot reach an agreement. Conﬂict can also lead to sabotage and destruction.
Understanding when conﬂict is most likely to arise is especially important in developing countries, where it strongly hinders
the improvement of economic and social conditions (Blattman and Miguel, 2010).
To understand why, consider that in small-scale societies with imperfect credit and insurance markets and a paucity
of formal savings instruments, a dense network of relationships, many of them kin-based, governs investment behavior
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Fafchamps, 2003). Examples include the joint purchase of large, indivisible capital goods (a plough, an irrigation pump);
nformal risk-sharing arrangements (IRSAs) in case the investment goes wrong; and gifts or informal loans to help ﬁnance
n investment, often with an expectation of reciprocity. The myriad ways in which people in small-scale societies in devel-
ping countries, when it comes to their investment behavior, are tied through informal arrangements would suggest a
remendous scope for disagreement, and if not settled, for conﬂict. One plausible motive would be when one party is more
autious, i.e. more risk averse, than the other, so that conﬂict may  result from disagreement about the amount of exposure
o risk of the investment that parties are jointly engaged in. In this paper we examine conﬂict from a microeconomic per-
pective, focusing on the role of heterogeneous risk preferences in determining interpersonal conﬂicts in rural villages in
ganda.
From a theoretical perspective, conﬂict may  be modeled as the outcome of a failed bargaining process (e.g., Fearon, 1995).
n the context of farming, where investments are often made jointly by groups of farmers, bargaining situations may be at the
eart of social tensions. Consider two farmers who face the decision of how much to invest for their farming activities, e.g.,
n buying a plough. Assume they will equally share the payoffs from harvesting and the investment is indivisible. A central
spect of this decision, given price and yield uncertainty, is how much risk to take. If risk preferences are private information,
ach farmer may  have an incentive to misrepresent them during bargaining. This can lead to failed agreements (Kennan and
ilson, 1993) and generate conﬂict between the two farmers. This may  be especially likely if their risk preferences differ
ubstantially. In this paper, we investigate empirically whether such a relationship between risk attitudes and conﬂicts
xists. We  ask, are two individuals with different risk attitudes more likely to suffer from interpersonal conﬂict? Our study
ocuses on a society that has historically suffered from violence among its people, the Bagisu people in Eastern Uganda
Heald, 1998). Within this region, we collect information on interpersonal conﬂict among pairs of adults living in the same
illage. In particular, we ask whether village members get along well or not, inquiring in a sensitive manner about past
onﬂict. Additionally, we collect information about a wide range of socio-economic variables and other characteristics of the
ocial link between each pair of adults. Two weeks following the survey, we elicit individual risk attitudes in an incentivized
xperiment.
Our empirical approach is based on the examination of the relationship between conﬂict and risk attitudes, focusing on
hether the likelihood of a conﬂictual relationship between two linked individuals is determined by the absolute difference
n their degrees of risk aversion, controlling for other relevant individual and pair characteristics. Since the composition
f rural villages cannot be exogenously changed, our results cannot be interpreted as causal evidence. However, focusing
n different subgroups of the population and conducting an analysis based on random links, as detailed below, provides
uggestive evidence for a particular direction of the relationship. Further, providing correlational evidence is nevertheless
mportant for several reasons. To our knowledge, no previous study has examined the determinants of interpersonal conﬂict,
s the focus in the literature is often on friendships or, generally, positive social ties. Second, we elicit an incentivized measure
f risk attitudes, and not only relate conﬂict to individual socio-demographic characteristics. Third, interpersonal conﬂict
ay be at the very heart of the violent episodes that the people in African countries often suffer. Hence, understanding its
otential sources may  be valuable in deterring future violence.
Our results reveal that an increase in the difference in risk attitudes between two individuals signiﬁcantly increases
he likelihood of conﬂict, controlling for as many differences in other characteristics as possible, as well as for relationship
haracteristics. More precisely, a one standard deviation increase in the difference in risk attitudes (measured in terms of the
istance between estimated CRRA parameters) multiplies the odds ratio of conﬂict by 1.23 (in absolute terms, the odds ratio
ncreases by 0.21). Two other factors signiﬁcantly increase the odds of conﬂict, difference in age and difference in gender.
he effect of differences in risk attitudes is very similar in magnitude to that of differences in age, and somewhat smaller
han that of differences in gender.
We  ﬁnd that differences in risk attitudes are more strongly related to the presence of interpersonal conﬂicts among kin. A
ne standard deviation increase in the difference in risk attitudes multiplies the odds ratio of conﬂict by a factor of almost 2
1.92). This result is in line with the argument that bargaining among farmers may  lead to conﬂict. As Heald (1998) reports,
n the most recent ethnography of the Bagisu, resource allocation decisions among farmers (especially over land) are made
n extended families, i.e. among kin, and frequently give rise to conﬂict. Such results are also in line with recent evidence
rom Attanasio et al. (2012), who ﬁnd that relatives are less likely to form risk sharing groups if their risk preferences are
ifferent.
While differences in risk attitudes could lead to conﬂict for the reasons stated above, the link could also be in the opposite
irection. Individuals, who experience interpersonal conﬂict may  break off relationships, decrease their social contact and
ver time diverge in their risk attitudes. Our ﬁnding that the role of risk attitudes is especially important in conﬂicts among
in, where social relationships are relatively unlikely to break, makes such a channel appear unlikely. To nevertheless explore
his possibility, we exploit the fact that individuals from different villages are not in contact, while almost everyone within
 village knows each other and, hence, has either a non-conﬂictual or a conﬂictual relationship. We  randomly generate links
etween individuals across villages and thereby simulate a distribution of differences in risk attitudes among individuals
ho have no social relationship. If conﬂict leads to the breakage of links and in turn to segregation of risk attitudes, we  would
xpect the difference in risk attitudes among those who are randomly linked to be similar to those who have conﬂictual
inks. However, differences in risk attitudes are larger among individuals who  experienced conﬂict. Further, an increase in
he difference in risk attitudes is signiﬁcantly related to an increase in the likelihood of conﬂict between two individuals,
elative to the likelihood of not knowing each other (as measured by a random link).
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We  explore whether the level of risk aversion, instead of heterogeneity, is directly related to conﬂict. For example,
individuals who are more risk seeking could also be more likely to exhibit interpersonal conﬂict. However, we do not ﬁnd
that risk attitudes differ signiﬁcantly on average between individuals who  experienced a conﬂict at least once and those who
never did. Additionally, between pairs with similar risk attitude, we examine whether the degree of risk aversion relates to
the likelihood of conﬂict. We do not ﬁnd evidence for this either.
Overall, this paper provides novel evidence on a potential source of interpersonal conﬂict, namely differences in risk
attitudes. Our evidence suggests that among relatives, who  frequently make joint economic decisions, the likelihood of
conﬂict may  increase with differences in their risk attitudes.1 This ﬁnding may  help us understand future conﬂict between
groups that make joint economic decisions, including small societies, kin or teams in organizations.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the most closely related literature on conﬂict and risk attitudes,
focusing on studies on developing countries. Section 3 describes the design of both survey and experiment. In Section 4 we
summarize the descriptive statistics of our data with respect to socio-economic characteristics and risk attitudes, before we
lay out the empirical strategy in Section 5. Results are reported in Section 6. Section 7 provides a discussion and Section 8
concludes.
2. Related literature
At the outset, we had a number of reasons to expect a link between interpersonal conﬂict and differences in risk attitudes.
First of all, there are several accounts by sociologists that differences between individuals are likely to be at the center of
conﬂict. For instance, Deutsch (1969) argues that “A conﬂict may  arise from differences in information or beliefs [. . .]. It may
reﬂect differences in interests, desires or values.” (Deutsch, 1969, p. 8). Since differences between individuals could be along
various dimensions, it is unclear which attributes matter most, and under which circumstances they matter. Research in
organizational science that studies conﬂict in teams, for example, documents that differences in demographic characteristics,
such as age and ethnicity, are related differently to different kinds of conﬂict (e.g., Pelled et al., 1999).
If individuals make joint economic decisions, differences in individual risk attitudes generate a potential for conﬂict. As
mentioned above, in bargaining situations, in which there is incomplete information, disagreements may  occur in theory
(e.g., Kennan and Wilson, 1993). In the online Appendix we  outline a very stylized model of bargaining over a risky investment
and show that disagreements over the amount to invest, which can be interpreted as conﬂict, arise when rather risk seeking
individuals make proposals to very risk averse individuals and equal payoff-sharing is assumed. Experimental evidence on
bargaining over lotteries has indeed shown that disagreements occur frequently between individuals with opposite risk
preferences (Roth et al., 1988). In situations of risk sharing, if the risk attitude of each party is known to all members in the
group, individuals can ﬁnd optimal risk sharing agreements despite differences in risk attitudes (Wilson, 1968; Mazzocco
and Saini, 2012). However, these agreements require differential payoffs depending on risk attitudes – more risk averse
individuals are insured by less risk averse individuals. These differences in payoffs may  be difﬁcult to enforce due to lack of
commitment and strong norms of equal payoff sharing in rural villages in Uganda. This may  lead to disagreements in joint
decision making under risk, which could translate to individuals developing a conﬂictual relationship.
A ﬁnal reason we expected to ﬁnd a link between conﬂict and differences in risk attitudes stems from the literature on
the determinants of civil conﬂict. One strand of the literature ﬁnds that increases in inequality and polarization within a
society make the emergence of conﬂict more likely (e.g., Esteban and Ray, 1994, 2011).2 Although measures of inequality
and polarization are mainly deﬁned in terms of income, Esteban and Ray (1994) suggest that other individual attributes
across which people might differ should be taken into account when examining the determinants of conﬂict, which could
include risk preferences.
Our study is related to a number of recent studies of risk attitudes, risk sharing and social ties. A ﬁrst strand in the
literature examines the impact of exposure to violent conﬂict, war  or bomb attacks, on individual risk attitudes (e.g., Callen
et al., 2014; Voors et al., 2012). For example, Voors et al. (2012) ﬁnd that individuals who were exposed to the consequences
of civil war in Burundi are more risk-seeking. Our study differs from theirs in that we  focus on interpersonal conﬂict between
two individuals and in particular examine the relation to differences in risk attitudes of the individuals involved.3
A second set of studies related to our study examines risk preferences and risk sharing arrangements in poor locales,
typically among small farmers. In developing countries, risk attitudes play a particularly important role due to the risky
1 Relatedly, in the context of the intergenerational transmission of risk attitudes Dohmen et al. (2012) report that a correlation between risk attitudes of
parents  and their children is signiﬁcantly weaker if children frequently fought with their parents. While their ﬁnding – based on a subsample of the German
population and, hence, documented in a industrialized and highly developed country – is surprisingly consistent with our results, Dohmen et al. (2012)
analysis is restricted to a very particular part of social networks, namely parents and their children. Instead, we focus on a broader category of kinship and
also  consider non-related individuals.
2 Prominent examples of other determinants of conﬂict in society include macroeconomic shocks – particularly variation in growth rates (see, e.g., Miguel
et  al., 2004) or in commodity prices (Besley and Persson, 2008; Dube and Vargas, 2013 and Bazzi and Blattman, 2014, among others).
3 The impact of exposure to war and violence has been studied also in other regards. Rohner et al. (2013) show that ethnic conﬂicts in Uganda during the
early  2000s had detrimental effects on trust, but fostered ethnic identity. Bauer et al. (2014) ﬁnd in the Republic of Georgia and Sierra Leone that exposure
to  civil war  during middle childhood and early adulthood signiﬁcantly strengthened prosociality concerns towards one’s in-group, but not out-groups.
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ecisions that farmers face, among others.4 Moreover, to examine and improve risk coping strategies in the absence of formal
nsurance markets, risk sharing groups received considerable attention lately. Starting with Townsend (1994), several studies
xamined risk sharing agreements using survey data (among others, Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003;
e Weerdt and Dercon, 2006; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Karlan et al., 2009). Other studies used lab experiments in the
eld, for example, to examine how different enforcement mechanisms and social relationships inﬂuence the formation of
isk sharing groups (e.g., Barr and Genicot, 2008; Barr et al., 2012a,b). Most closely related to the present study is the paper
y Attanasio et al. (2012) which examines the formation of risk sharing groups and shows that relatives and friends are
ore likely to form risk sharing groups. Our paper differs from theirs in that we  examine the presence of antagonistic social
elationships, and whether these are related to differences in risk attitudes.
A third strand of the literature examines the inﬂuence of social ties on behavior. Generally, recent experimental studies
ave focused on friendship compared to “other” ties. In particular, several studies have examined whether individuals are
ore generous towards their friends than towards others, where the latter might be either anonymous, unknown people or
imply not their best friends (Leider et al., 2009; Goeree et al., 2010; Bran˜as-Garza et al., 2010). Conﬂicts, though common
o many relationships and with potentially detrimental consequences for outcomes in society, have not been addressed in
his literature.
. Survey and experimental design
Our ﬁeldwork was conducted in Sironko District, eastern Uganda. Sironko is a densely populated area with an estimated
opulation of 346,400, roughly 284 inhabitants per squared kilometer, around 90% of whom live in rural areas (Ministry of
ater and Environment Uganda, 2010). People’s livelihoods depend primarily on farming and the majority belongs to the
thnical group of the Bagisu people. The Bagisu people have a reputation for violent conﬂict, especially intra-clan conﬂict,
ith kin pitted against kin. Conﬂicts among kin usually have their origin in access to resources, especially land, and are
requently triggered by the distribution of ancestral land upon the death of a family head. Unequal access to resources, as
ell as unequal success in life more generally, often gives rise to accusations of witchcraft and theft among kin, which can
ead to violent punishment of the accused (Heald, 1998).
For this study, we ﬁrst randomly selected ﬁve subcounties from Sironko District. Within every subcounty approximately
en villages were randomly selected. For each one we  took a census of households and their household members.5 Next, on
verage 20 households per village were randomly drawn to participate in the study and from these one adult per household
as randomly chosen to be invited to participate in our study. Since we do not focus on intra-household conﬂicts we  decided
o invite only one adult per household. Local village leaders acted as witnesses of the random selection process, to ensure
hat invited individuals would be willing to participate in the study.
Our ﬁeldwork consists of a survey of social links followed by an experiment that elicits risk attitudes. Out of 300 invited
ndividuals in total 275 participants, i.e. 92%, from 34 villages completed both survey and experiment which were conducted
owards the end of November and in the beginning of December 2012.6
.1. Survey
All participants were visited at home by trained local interviewers.7 The survey consists of two  main parts. In the ﬁrst
art, the social tie survey, we elicited the social links between all participants who  lived in the same village. In the second
art we collected individual socio-economic characteristics.
The social links among participants within a village were elicited as follows. In the interview the respondent was  given
he name and presented with a picture of one of her village members who also participated in our study. First of all, she
as asked whether she knew the other person. If not, we proceeded to the name and picture of the next village member
n our list. If yes, she was asked, are you close friends? If the answer was no, she was  asked do you get along well? Based
n the last two questions we deﬁne a dichotomous variable as a measure for interpersonal conﬂict. This is equal to one
f the respondent denied to be close friends with the other and additionally reported that they did not get along well in
he past. Since direct questions on conﬂicts may  have adverse effects in these small societies, we  decided to inquire about
ossible conﬂicts among village members in a subtle and non-provocative manner. The alternative of asking a respondent
4 Early studies investigated the risk attitudes of farmers (e.g., Binswanger, 1980). Also, as argued by Lipton (1968), Norman (1974), Schluter and Mount
1976), Scott (1976) and Wolgin (1975) risk preferences of farmers might play an important role for the adoption of new technologies and agricultural
ractices. This is conﬁrmed by a recent study that relates farmers’ experimentally measured risk attitudes to the adoption of a superior form of cotton
roduction (Liu, 2013).
5 By household members we mean all those who usually sleep and eat in the same house. We also include those who  are absent for a while, but who
lan  to return, for example children in boarding school, a member of the household in hospital, or somebody who  is away because he or she is earning
ncome for the household.
6 The pool of subjects used in this study is actually a subgroup of a larger sample which we  prepared for three independent studies. The subjects in the
ull  sample were randomly allocated to one of the three studies.
7 At the time when the survey was conducted participants did not have any information or knowledge about what might happen in the experiment.
owever, they knew that they would be invited to participate in an experiment some weeks later.
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Table 1
Lotteries
Lottery High outcomep = 0.8 Low outcomep = 0.2   CRRA range CRRA estimate
A 6000 6000 6000 0 8.13 to inﬁnity 9.54
B  7000 5000 6600 800 2.69 to 8.13 5.41
C  8000 4000 7200 1600 1.55 to 2.69 2.12
D  9000 3000 7800 2400 1.03 to 1.55 1.29
E  10,000 2000 8400 3200 0.70 to 1.03 0.87
F  11,000 1000 9000 4000 0.38 to 0.70 0.54
G  12,000 0 9600 4800 −inﬁnity to 0.38 −1.03
Note: Amounts stated in Ugandan Shillings (UGX); 1000 UGX ≈0.39 USD (as of October 14, 2013).  is the expected value,  indicates the standard
deviation of the lottery. Based on expected utility theory and assuming constant relative risk aversion the CRRA parameter r refers to a utility function
U(x)  = x1−r(1 − r)−1. For example, F is the optimal choice for an expected utility maximizer with 0.38 ≤ r ≤ 0.70 and CRRA utility.
CRRA estimates are approximated as midpoints of the closed CRRA intervals (for decisions B to F). The mean range of the intervals is used to construct the
CRRA  estimate for decisions A and G.
directly whether or not a conﬂictual relationship exists was deemed as potentially disruptive by key informants who  we
consulted when designing the questionnaire. At the same time, they intimated that, in this local culture, respondents would
answer “no” to the question “do you get along well?” to indicate that they are in conﬂict. Given our knowledge about the local
culture and the sensitivity of conﬂict elicitation, we deem this therefore to be the most correct way  to measure interpersonal
conﬂicts.
Next, we elicited the kinship relation between the respondent and the village member. They were asked whether they
were related and if so, what kind of kinship existed, including blood relationships (parents, siblings, uncles, cousins, etc.) and
afﬁnal kin (related by marriage, i.e. in-laws). In subsequent questions, the respondent was  asked whether they belonged to
same social groups (including saving group, burial society, friendship group, farmers’ group, microﬁnance group, drinking
group, religious group) and whether they were neighbors. Further, they were asked whether they had given or received a
loan or gift, in cash or in kind.
In the second part of the survey we collected information on socio-economic characteristics of the respondent. These
include gender, age, religion, ethnicity, and marital status. We  also measured whether the respondent is the head of her
household or not, her level of education and her occupation. We  also asked about possible illnesses or disabilities. The survey
then proceeded to measure the household’s ownership of assets, including dwelling characteristics, vehicles, livestock and
land. To construct a wealth index we conducted a principal component analysis, following Filmer and Pritchett (2001).8 The
complete list of questions for the survey is provided in Tables B.1 and B.2 in the online Appendix, respectively.
3.2. Experiment
We  conducted the experiment two weeks after the survey. In the experiment participants’ individual risk attitudes were
elicited. We used the elicitation method of Gneezy and Potters (1997), in which a decision maker chooses how much to
invest into a risky asset. Starting with 6000 Ugandan Shillings (about 1.5 times the local daily wage), the decision maker
chooses how much to invest in an asset that yields a net return of 100% with probability 0.8 or is lost completely, with
probability 0.2. We  framed this task as choosing one out of seven different lotteries, which are presented in Table 1, in
line with previous studies on risk taking in developing countries.9 Each lottery was described to participants verbally and
graphically. The instructions are provided in the online Appendix. Before making a choice, each subject was  asked to answer
four control questions.
Assuming CRRA preferences, choosing lottery A, for example, implies a higher degree of relative risk aversion than lottery
B or C. Hence, lottery choices serve as an ordinal measure for individual risk attitudes and can be translated into unique
intervals of CRRA parameters, for which choosing the respective lottery is optimal from an expected utility perspective. An
individual’s risk attitude is then approximated by the midpoint of her respective parameter interval. For boundary choices
A and G, an individual’s risk attitude is extrapolated by adding or subtracting the mean range of closed parameter intervals
to the lower or upper boundary value, respectively (for a similar approach see Binswanger, 1981).10
8 In particular, the wealth index is determined by the number of rooms in the household’s dwelling; the material the ﬂoor is made of (e.g., earth and cow
dung  or cement); the main source of lighting in the dwelling (e.g., electricity or different forms of lanterns); the number of indigenous, exotic and crossed
cattle; the number of goats; the total size of land owned by the household; the number of vehicles owned by the household, thereof bicycles and motor
vehicles; the number of durable goods such as generators, stoves, sofas, beds, radios, televisions, jewelry, watches, phones, and household appliances; and
the  number of equipment owned by the household, i.e. storage facilities, livestock stalls, watering cans, insecticide pumps, coffee pulping machines, wheel
barrows, and animal pulled ploughs.
9 Examples of studies on risk taking in developing countries, that use a similar method include Binswanger (1980), Henrich and McElreath (2002),
Attanasio et al. (2012).
10 As a robustness check we also dropped such observations, which, however, reduces our sample size considerably. We also used the geometric mean
instead. In both cases, results remain qualitatively similar.
A.M. Lahno et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 118 (2015) 136–149 141
Table  2
Summary statistics.
Mean Std. Dev.
Gender 0.46 0.50
Age 40.23 13.36
Household head 0.62 0.49
Married 0.81 0.39
Number of people in household 6.04 2.77
Farming as primary occupation 0.85 0.36
Farming activities 0.96 0.20
Years of schooling 5.21 2.87
Education level Freq. (%)
None 9.1
Primary 70.2
Secondary 19.1
Tertiary 1.6
Religion Freq. (%)
Catholicism 38.9
Protestantism (Anglicanism &other) 39.3
Islam 11.5
Seventh day Adventists 0.4
Born again 9.9
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rote: N = 252 subjects participated in both the survey and the experiment.
At the beginning of each session participants were informed that they would be able to earn money and that their
ecisions were conﬁdential. Then everyone was asked to take a seat in the meeting room. Chairs were arranged such that
o subject could see what another subject was looking at. At the end of the experiment, draws were made, using a bag
ith counters, and participants received their payments in private.11 Overall, 15 sessions were conducted with on average
8 subjects and maximally 21 subjects. In each session all participants came from the same subcounty, but could come
rom different villages. In total 275 subjects participated, of whom 252 correctly answered the control questions. Only these
ubjects are included in the analyses below.12 Experimental sessions were conducted by two trained experimenters, who
ere supported by one assistant each, and took around two hours including payment.
. Descriptive statistics
This section provides the descriptive statistics of our data with respect to individual socio-economic characteristics
Section 4.1) and behavior in the experimental task (Section 4.2).
.1. Socio-economic characteristics
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the participants’ socio-economic characteristics. 49% of participants were
emale. Age varies from 18 to 70, the average participant being approximately 40 years old. 62% were heads of their household,
1% were married, and the average household consisted of about six members.13 A vast majority earned most of their income
y farming activities. In fact, 96% were involved in farming, though not necessarily as their primary occupation. Around 70%
ttended only primary school. Catholicism and Protestantism are the most prevalent religions, each practiced by nearly 40%
f our participants.
11 After this choice task, subjects participated in a second task, independent of this one.
12 We excluded 23 participants. Not surprisingly, these people only had little education (primary education or less), only about two years of schooling
n  average. About 78% of them were female. Table C.1 in the online Appendix provides the above individual characteristics for both analyzed and initial
ample. While these do not differ substantially, we  control for individual characteristics in our analysis. Comparing the subsample which was dropped
or  the analysis to the analyzed sample we ﬁnd that the proportion of female is larger (Fisher exact test p-value 0.004); the frequency of subjects who
re  married is smaller (Fisher exact test p-value 0.029); the number of years at school is smaller (MW-test p-value < 0.01); and the median age is higher
MW-test p-value 0.035). Household size (MW-test p-value 0.119) and differences in occupation (Fisher exact test p-value 1.000 (for primary occupation),
.265  (for general farming activities)) are not signiﬁcantly different. We  do not ﬁnd that the analyzed sample and the initial sample, which also includes
ubjects who failed in the control tasks, differ signiﬁcantly with respect to risk attitudes. Subjects excluded from the analysis were on average slightly more
isk  averse, though not signiﬁcantly (MW-test on the average choice, p-value 0.107).
13 In these villages it is possible that more than one person in the household takes on the role of the household head.
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Table 3
Distribution of risk attitudes.
Lottery
A B C D E F G
Frequency 37 31 36 23 57 35 33
in  % 14.68% 12.30% 14.29% 9.13% 22.62% 13.89% 13.10%
Note: Absolute and relative frequency of elicited risk attitudes in the experiment.
4.2. Risk attitudes
In the experiment subjects were asked to choose one out of the seven lotteries given in Table 1. Table 3 reports the
distribution of choices observed. We  observe that 22.6% chose lottery E, which paid 10,000 UGX with 80% chance and 2000
UGX with 20% chance. Only 9% chose D. A similar percentage, 14.7% and 13.1%, chose the extremes A (very risk averse) and
G (risk loving), respectively.
Hence, we observe considerable heterogeneity in individual risk attitudes, which can be partially explained by individual
characteristics. We  ﬁnd that gender, age and religion are signiﬁcantly correlated with risk tolerance.14 Interestingly, we ﬁnd
that men  are signiﬁcantly more risk averse than women, which although surprising, has been found before in studies of
small scale societies (e.g., Henrich and McElreath, 2002; Gneezy et al., 2009). As expected, we  ﬁnd that age is negatively
correlated with risky choices in the experiment, in line with, e.g., Binswanger (1980) and Henrich and McElreath (2002). In
our sample, Protestants are signiﬁcantly more risk seeking compared with other Christians or Non-Christians, consistent
with ﬁndings in Dohmen et al. (2011) based on the German SOEP panel.
5. Empirical strategy
This section ﬁrst describes how we construct a dataset of links (dyads) between different participants and provides
summary statistics with respect to the extent of interpersonal conﬂict (Section 5.1). Then, we  specify the regression approach
(Section 5.2).
5.1. Dyadic dataset
In the social tie survey we elicited each participant’s links to any other participant from the respondent’s village (as
described in Section 3.1). Based on all interviews we  construct a dataset, in which each observation refers to a possible tie
between two  respondents, i and j, whose link was documented in the survey. In the following we refer to one observation
as a dyad and to the dataset as the dyadic dataset.
We categorize each dyad ij either as a no-conﬂict link or a conﬂict link to distinguish between those village members
who get along well and those who experienced conﬂicts.15 We  use the “or-matching”, i.e. deﬁne a conﬂict link to exist if
either i or j (or both) indicated a conﬂict in the social tie survey. Naturally, people might be reluctant to honestly state a
negative relationship in the interview. Also, someone who  actually upset her peer (e.g., by not paying back a loan) might be
particularly likely to conceal these disputes. The “or-matching” allows us to identify such conﬂict links.
Next, based on i and j’s risk attitudes, in the following denoted by RAi and RAj, respectively, we  deﬁne the difference in
their risk attitudes, ıRA
ij
, as the absolute distance between RAi and RAj. Beyond that, for each dyad ij, we  control for differences
in individual socio-economic characteristics between i and j as well as other characteristics of the link between i and j. More
speciﬁcally, based on the socio-economic survey we  measure absolute distances in age (in years), wealth (wealth index) and
education (ordered categories of primary, secondary, tertiary school); we also code differences in gender, marital status and
occupation, whether they belong to different ethnic groups, and whether they differ in their ability to work. As cited above,
existing research in organizational science (Pelled et al., 1999) suggests that differences in characteristics such as age could
lead to conﬂict.
In addition to differences in socio-economic characteristics, we control for characteristics of the social tie. Differences in
the degree of interaction may  naturally affect the scope for conﬂict in a dyad. In particular, we control for whether i and j
are neighbors, belong to the same social groups, received or offered a loan and/or gift to the other one, and whether they
are kin.16 Our deﬁnition of kin captures a broad measure for being related. Not only close relatives, i.e. parents and their
children, but also relatives over two generations, such as grandparents and their grandchildren or cousins, are classiﬁed as
14 We conducted an ordered logit regression with lottery choice as dependent variable as well as a linear regression with CRRA estimate as dependent
variable. Details can be obtained from the authors.
15 Only one pair of individuals agreed to not know each other, in which case we  would say that no link exists. This observation is excluded in the analysis
reported in Section 6.1.
16 We deﬁne the category kin similar to the one of conﬂict, i.e. based on the “or”-matching. This means, a kin link is assumed to exist if at least one of both
respondents claimed that a kin link exists. The same applies to the classiﬁcation of neighbors, group members, and exchanges of gifts and loans.
k
s
A
w
v
o
m
e
A
5
d
d
T
w
E
ﬁ
w
i
6
c
s
l
6
f
i
i
i
o
v
s
d
n
t
w
w
oA.M. Lahno et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 118 (2015) 136–149 143
in. Kinship constitutes an important component within the social network of Ugandan people, as in other African rural
ocieties. Among others, kin share and jointly utilize land, which is passed on from generation to generation.
Our sample consists of 917 dyads. On average, for each respondent we elicited his or her link to eight other participants.
round one ﬁfth (21.5%) of the dyads are categorized as conﬂict links. Almost 40% of our sample are classiﬁed as kin. Conﬂicts
ithin kin are less likely than across kin. Among kin, 16.5% of dyads correspond to conﬂict links, compared to 24.5% among
illage members who are not related. Due to random sampling nearly half of all dyads, 51.3%, are formed by one man and
ne woman, 21.2% by two women and 27.6% refer to two men. Interestingly, conﬂict links occur least frequently between
en, only in 12.7% of all respective dyads. In comparison, 26.8% of mixed gender pairs and 20.1% of all female-female dyads
xperienced a conﬂict, respectively. A detailed partition of our sample with respect to conﬂict is provided in the online
ppendix.
.2. Model speciﬁcation
In the data analysis we estimate logit models based on our dyadic dataset, to regress the likelihood of a conﬂict link on
ifferences in individual characteristics as well as characteristics of links.17 Summary statistics of the main variables in the
ataset are provided in the online Appendix.
We  use the following notation to specify dyad ij:
cij ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator for a conﬂict link between i and j;
ıRA
ij
denotes the difference in i’s and j’s risk attitudes;
E
ij
is a row vector of differences between i’s and j’s socio-economic characteristics;
S
ij
is a row vector of characteristics of i’s and j’s link;
vij denotes the village of i and j;
Si, Sj are row vectors that indicate in which experimental sessions i and j participated.18
hen, the likelihood of the presence of a conﬂict, i.e. cij = 1, is assumed to be given by
Pr(cij = 1|ıRAij ; Eij; Sij; vij; Sij) = F(  ˛ + ıRAij  ˇ + Eij + Sij + vij + Si	1 + Sj	2 + εij) (1)
here F(x) = (1 − exp(x))−x denotes the cumulative standard logistic distribution function. We  estimate the parameters in
q. (1) based on a dyadic regression approach, in which we  cluster standard errors at the village level. We include village
xed effects and session ﬁxed effects for both participants. Since all links (and observed conﬂicts) concern relationships
ithin villages, controlling for village speciﬁc unobservables as well as for correlations at the village level is particularly
mportant.19
. Results
This section examines whether differences in individual risk attitudes are related to the likelihood of interpersonal
onﬂict. First, we report estimation results based on the dyadic dataset of links among village members (Section 6.1). In a
econd step, we apply a simulation based approach which allows us to compare existing links (no-conﬂict links or conﬂict
inks) to randomly generated links across villages (Section 6.2).
.1. Conﬂict links and differences in risk attitudes
Fig. 1 displays the relationship between differences in risk attitudes, in terms of percentiles of the distribution, and the
requency of conﬂict. This relationship is displayed for the whole sample, kin and nonkin dyads. It reveals a non-monotone,
nverse U-shaped relationship for the whole sample. As the difference in risk attitudes increases, the likelihood of conﬂict
ncreases until a certain threshold (the 50th percentile) and decreases afterwards.
17 These covariates control for characteristics that might be correlated with both differences in risk attitudes and the likelihood of conﬂict. The character-
stics of social links might induce an endogeneity bias. For example, individuals who  experienced a conﬂict might be less likely to exchange loans or gifts,
r  participate in the same social group. As a robustness check we tested whether results change if social link characteristics are excluded as independent
ariables, which is not the case. We will refer to additional results in the online Appendix where relevant in Section 6.
18 Note that for all dyads it holds that i and j come from the same village. In contrast, i and j do not necessarily participate in the same experimental
ession since invitations to particular sessions were randomized at the subcounty level.
19 Alternatively to clustering at the village level, we could also cluster in two dimensions with respect to both sessions of i and j. This approach, actually
eveloped for panel data analysis in ﬁnance (see e.g., Gelbach and Miller, 2009; Thompson, 2011), is not optimally suited for our dataset because the
umber of sessions is substantially smaller than the number of villages. But as discussed in Petersen (2009) clustered standard errors “are consistent as
he  number of clusters grows” (p. 440); and, hence, clustering at the village level provides the more conservative approach which also cleanly controls for
ithin-village correlations. When conducting a two-dimensional clustering dyadic regression, the results remain qualitatively the same. Another approach
ould be to cluster on the subcounty level since all participants of each experimental session belong to the same subcounty. However, since our dataset
nly  covers ﬁve different subcounties, following the argument above, the number of clusters is not sufﬁciently large.
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Fig. 1. Frequency of conﬂict by percentiles of differences in risk attitudes. Note: Polynomial ﬁtted regressions predicting the frequency of conﬂict from a
2nd  degree polynomial in the percentile of ıRA . Conﬁdence intervals refer to the 95% level.We  ﬁnd a strong and signiﬁcant difference in the relationship between differences in risk attitudes and likelihood of
conﬂict depending on whether the two members of the dyad are related or not. For kin dyads, the likelihood of con-
ﬂict increases monotonically with differences in risk attitudes. The predicted likelihood of conﬂict is 0.13 at the lowest
percentile of the distribution of differences in risk attitudes. It increases to 0.22 at the 100th percentile of the distri-
bution of differences in risk attitudes. In contrast, for nonkin dyads, the likelihood of conﬂict exhibits a strong inverse
U-shaped relationship. An explanation for this difference may  be the easier avoidance of interaction between nonkin
dyads, relative to kin dyads. Potentially, those individuals who are not related and exhibit large differences in risk atti-
tudes avoid joint decisions or social contact and thereby conﬂict more easily. At the same time, avoiding contact and
joint decision-making between kin is more difﬁcult, as farming as well as other activities are often discussed and shared
within kin.
Our regression analysis reveals a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of differences in individual risk attitudes on the likelihood of conﬂict.
Table 4 reports the estimated marginal effects based on two model speciﬁcations and different subsamples. Considering all
dyads, in columns (1) and (2), the probability of conﬂict increases by 1 percentage point when the difference in risk attitudes
increases by one unit. Relative to the average frequency of conﬂict, namely 21.5%, this corresponds to an increase by roughly
5%.
Two other individual characteristics increase the likelihood of conﬂict signiﬁcantly, differences in age and gender. If we
compare the magnitude of their effect in terms of standard deviations to that of differences in risk attitudes, we ﬁnd that
an increase in one standard deviation in difference in risk attitudes multiplies the odds ratio of conﬂict by 1.23 (in absolute
terms, it increases the odds ratio of conﬂict by 0.210). This effect is similar to the effect of increasing age by one standard
deviation, 1.31, and somewhat smaller than that of changing gender from a same-gender link to a different-gender link,
1.63. Hence, in terms of magnitude, differences in risk attitudes are important as well.
By contrast, two factors signiﬁcantly lower the likelihood of conﬂict: belonging to a different religion and belonging
to a different social group. Both ﬁndings suggest that conﬂicts are likely to occur among those village members who  fre-
quently meet, for example, in religious gatherings, drinking groups or microﬁnance meetings. This ﬁnding is also in line
with our conjecture from Fig. 1, namely that conﬂict may  arise less often among individuals who do not interact with
each other socially. Further, interpersonal conﬂicts are signiﬁcantly less likely within kin relative to unrelated village
members.
Next, we examine whether the relationship between differences in risk attitudes and conﬂict differs between two sub-
samples, kin and nonkin, columns (3) and (4) of Table 5. An important feature of this split is that kin dyads are exogenously
determined. Remarkably, the relationship between differences in risk attitudes and the presence of conﬂicts is more pro-
nounced within extended families, in terms of magnitude and signiﬁcance. We  ﬁnd that one unit increase in the difference
in risk attitudes increases the probability that kin experience conﬂicts by 2 percentage points. In terms of standard devia-
tions, an increase in one standard deviation in difference in risk attitudes multiplies the odds ratio of conﬂict by almost 2
(1.92). Further, differences in age do not signiﬁcantly affect the likelihood of conﬂict within kin, although they still do in
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Table  4
Dyadic logit regression.
Likelihood of conﬂict All (1) All (2) Nonkin(3) Kin (4)
ıRA 0.008* 0.008* 0.003 0.019**
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.009]
Age  distance 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Diff.  gender 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.098** 0.240***
[0.037] [0.030] [0.040] [0.039]
Diff.  tribe 0.109 0.054 0.113 0.284
[0.139] [0.123] [0.132] [0.184]
Diff.  marital status 0.046 0.036 0.02 −0.016
[0.036] [0.038] [0.048] [0.050]
Diff.  religion −0.068*** −0.087*** −0.104*** 0.002
[0.024] [0.021] [0.032] [0.053]
Education distance 0.019 0.006 −0.018 0.001
[0.022] [0.024] [0.028] [0.053]
Wealth distance −0.004 −0.003 0.002 −0.007
[0.010] [0.008] [0.009] [0.026]
Diff.  occupation 0.033 0.034 0.037 0.054
[0.044] [0.039] [0.056] [0.066]
Diff.  in disabilities 0.053 0.066** 0.060* 0.089
[0.033] [0.030] [0.030] [0.054]
Neighbors −0.145*** −0.190*** −0.059
[0.030] [0.042] [0.048]
Diff.  groups −0.168*** −0.186*** −0.145***
[0.036] [0.043] [0.033]
Loan  −0.0320 −0.0780 0.0040
[0.038] [0.057] [0.038]
Gift  −0.0510 −0.0590 0.085*
[0.036] [0.048] [0.046]
Kin  −0.082**
[0.036]
%  conﬂict 21.46% 21.46% 24.56% 16.52%
Observations 839 839 521 251
Pseudo  log-likelihood −373.7 −328.1 −205.6 −77.0
Note: This table reports marginal effects from a dyadic logit regression on conﬂict. ıRA denotes the absolute difference between individual risk attitudes;
Age,  Wealth and Education distance refer to absolute differences in age (years), wealth index, education (primary, secondary, tertiary), respectively. Variables
Diff.  (·) denote dummy  variables that take value 1 if individuals differ w.r.t. (·), and 0 otherwise. Neighbors,  Loan, Gift, Kin are dummy variables that take
value  1 if individuals are neighbors, exchanged a loan and gift with each other, and are kin, respectively. Both regressions includes village ﬁxed effects and
session ﬁxed effects for both individuals per dyad. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and reported in brackets; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table 5
Mean differences in risk attitudes, by category of link.
No conﬂict Conﬂict No tie
Mean ıRA 3.37 3.48 3.45
Std.  error 0.119 0.230 0.021
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bote: This table reports the average of absolute values in risk attitudes (ıRA) and their standard errors by three categories of links: no-conﬂict link,  conﬂict
ink,  based on existing ties in the dataset, and random link, based on simulated ties.
on-related dyads.20 The difference between kin and nonkin dyads is important as it provides suggestive evidence in terms
f the direction of causality. If conﬂict would lead to differences in risk attitudes, by breaking social ties, we would not expect
he link to be stronger among kin, but rather among nonkin, since ties are easier and perhaps less costly to break. Instead, we
nd that the relationship is particularly strong among kin, which is line with the fact that joint decision making, especially
ith respect to investment activities in farming, occurs within the family.
Differences in risk attitudes might also play a different role across different gender combinations in a dyad. We ﬁnduggestive evidence that different risk attitudes and conﬂict might be particularly related among male-male dyads. However,
e do not identify statistically signiﬁcant relationships, potentially due to the limited sample sizes.
Our results so far can be summarized as follows.
20 Given the signiﬁcant correlation between age and individual risk attitudes (Section 4.2), we ran additional estimations in which we control for whether
elatives belong to the same generation, such as siblings or cousins, or to different generations, such as parents and their children or aunts/uncles and their
ieces/nephews. Again, differences in risk attitudes are signiﬁcantly related to the presence of conﬂicts, magnitudes and signiﬁcance remain unchanged,
ut  generation does not matter signiﬁcantly for the likelihood of conﬂict.
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Result 1. Differences in risk attitudes are signiﬁcantly and positively related to conﬂict. This relationship is particularly
strong for kin.
6.2. Conﬂict versus random links: a simulation approach
The analysis so far has relied on the dataset of existing dyads at the village level. In this dataset, every dyad is either
in conﬂict or no conﬂict. There are no dyads (except for one) in which two  individuals within a village report not to know
each other. In this section we exploit the fact that individuals from different villages only rarely have social interaction and
thereby generate random links, between pairs of people who  in a majority of the cases do not know each other. The question
we ask is, are differences in risk attitudes in links with conﬂict similar to links between individuals who do not know each
other?
In the relationship between conﬂict and differences in risk attitudes, there are two  directions of causality. First, differences
in risk attitudes could lead to conﬂict. Second, conﬂict may  lead to differences in risk attitudes. One central way  in which
the latter could occur is through conﬂict breaking the relationship between two individuals. Existing research shows that
individuals tend to assimilate to their peer group with respect to individual attitudes (Ahern et al., 2013). Thus, by assimilating
to different peer groups, two individuals who had a conﬂict and broke their social interaction might evolve towards different
risk attitudes. If so, we would expect the difference in risk attitudes of a pair of individuals who  experienced a conﬂict and
in turn broke their social interaction to be on average similar to that of a pair of individuals who do not know each other. If
the data conﬁrms such a pattern, it would provide evidence in line with conﬂict leading to different risk attitudes, through
the mechanism outlined above. If it does not, it would suggest that at least one central mechanism explaining why conﬂict
may  lead to differences in risk attitudes is not at play in our data.
Speciﬁcally, we linked each individual with 100 randomly selected individuals from different villages, without replace-
ment. We  chose to generate links across different villages since social interaction is rare across villages. Hence, by generating
random links across villages we are generating ties among individuals who in the vast majority of the cases do not know
each other. Appending these random links to our initial dyadic dataset generates a new dyadic dataset which allows for three
categories of dyads.
Table 5 summarizes the differences in risk attitudes for dyads of all three categories. We  ﬁnd that differences in risk
attitudes differ across the three categories. The average is largest for those who  experienced a conﬂict, and smallest for those
who know each other and get along well. For random links, the mean difference in risk attitudes is in between no-conﬂict
and conﬂict links.
As a next step, we ask whether an increase in the difference in risk attitude is equally likely to predict a conﬂict link
and a random link. To do so, we estimate an multinomial logit model, in which we regress the likelihood of observing a
particular category of dyad, i.e. no-conﬂict link, conﬂict link or random link, on differences in risk attitudes and other socio-
economic characteristics.21 Analogously to models estimated in Section 6.1, we  include village and session ﬁxed effects of
both individuals, and standard errors are clustered at the village level.22 We  ﬁnd that differences in risk attitudes signiﬁcantly
increase the probability that individuals experience conﬂicts compared to the probability that individuals are randomly
linked, as shown in Table 6. By contrast, an increase in the difference in risk attitudes does not imply a signiﬁcant change in
the likelihood of getting along well, i.e. no-conﬂict,  relative to the likelihood of not knowing each other.23 The ﬁndings that
conﬂicts are signiﬁcantly correlated to differences in age, gender, and religion, are once more conﬁrmed.
Result 2. In a sample of existing links between village members and randomly generated links across different villages,
differences in individual risk attitudes are largest for conﬂict links. An increase in the difference in risk attitudes is signiﬁcantly
related to the likelihood of conﬂict relative to the likelihood of a random link.
7. Discussion
We  ﬁnd that individuals are signiﬁcantly more likely to report a conﬂictual relationship when the difference between
their individual risk attitudes is larger. This tendency is particularly pronounced among kin. Further, differences in risk
attitudes are signiﬁcantly larger in dyads with reported conﬂictual links than in random dyads.To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst paper to identify close interdependencies between interpersonal conﬂicts and
risk attitudes. The ﬁnding that individuals who differ in their attitudes towards risk are more likely to experience conﬂicts
with each other is novel to the literature on risk attitudes as well as to the literature on social ties.
21 Note that information about the social relationship is not available for simulated ties, and hence, variables from the social tie survey are not included
in  these regressions.
22 For randomly generated links, individuals i and j do not come from the same village. Hence, clustering only at i’s village might not completely rule out
biased  standard errors. However, we address this concern by letting each individual appear as person i in at least one observation, and by including ﬁxed
effects of i and j’s villages and sessions.
23 The effects might seem small in their magnitude, but given that in the extended sample only 0.75% of dyads have interpersonal conﬂicts, an increase
in  the likelihood of such a conﬂict by 0.03 percentage points is relatively large and close to 4%.
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Table  6
Multinomial logit regression: likelihood of link categories.
No conﬂict Conﬂict
ıRA −0.000249 0.000276**
[0.000241] [0.000127]
Age  distance −0.000016 0.000102**
[0.000078] [0.000043]
Diff.  gender −0.001955 0.004267***
[0.001874] [0.001183]
Diff.  tribe −0.004798 0.00368
[0.003598] [0.003470]
Diff.  marital status −0.003243 0.001347
[0.002271] [0.001671]
Diff.  Religion −0.020480*** −0.006009***
[0.005482] [0.001694]
Education distance −0.000602 0.000029
[0.001507] [0.000902]
Wealth distance −0.00046 −0.000329
[0.000578] [0.000377]
Diff.  occupation −0.003791 −0.001294
[0.002325] [0.002170]
Diff.  in disabilities −0.001061 0.002782**
[0.001533] [0.001297]
Observations 26,117
Category of interest as % of all observations 2.76% 0.75%
Pseudo log-likelihood −3785
Note: This table reports the marginal effects of a multinomial logit regression. The dependent variable refers to the category of link, i.e. no-conﬂict link
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rcolumn (1)), conﬂict link (column (2)); random link is the base category. Independent variables are deﬁned as in Table 4. Regression includes village and
ession ﬁxed effects, for both individuals in each dyad. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and reported in brackets; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
 < 0.1.
We  acknowledge that the relationship between differences in risk attitudes and conﬂict may  critically rely on the partic-
lar source of conﬂict between pairs of individuals, which would have been a potential further step to investigate. However,
mong the Bagisu people in rural eastern Uganda sources of conﬂict are often expressed in terms of vague accusations of
witchcraft” and “theft” (Heald, 1998), making it difﬁcult to cleanly differentiate between sources. Further, we inquired
bout possible conﬂicts in the least intrusive manner possible, to avoid embarrassment, anguish or other possible adverse
ffects on participants. We  close this paper with some remarks on whether risk attitudes per se may  relate to conﬂict and
omments on identifying correlation versus causality.
.1. Risk levels or differences?
One may  conjecture that conﬂict may  be driven by levels of risk aversion, which perhaps correlate with some personality
raits, and not necessarily with differences in risk attitudes within a dyad. We  address this possible confound in two  ways.
irst, we ﬁnd that the average risk attitude elicited in the experiment does not differ signiﬁcantly between those people who
ctually report a conﬂict at least once compared to those who  never report a conﬂict (MW-test, p-value 0.12). For dyads
here individuals are similar in terms of their risk attitudes we test whether the level of risk attitudes has an effect on the
ikelihood of a conﬂict to be present.24 We  ﬁnd that the likelihood of a conﬂict link is not signiﬁcantly related to risk attitude
tself, conditional on (i) having exactly the same risk attitude (ıRA = 0), (ii) making neighboring lottery choices (e.g., i choosing
, j choosing A or C), (iii) having a difference in risk attitudes which is less than or equal to the smallest non-zero percentile
f the distribution of ıRA or (iv) less than or equal to the 25%-percentile. Hence, Result 1 and Result 2, reported above, are
ot driven by the possibility that the level and not the difference in risk attitudes is related to conﬂict.
.2. Correlation and causality
Exogenously generating dyads with varying differences in risk attitudes among individuals and observing conﬂict emer-
ence is highly unfeasible in a naturally occurring setting. We  are hence able to draw conclusions about correlations, but do
ot prove statements of causality.
Nonetheless, we ask, which mechanism seems more likely to explain the relations observed in our data? On the one
and, individuals might experience interpersonal conﬂict because they differ in their risk attitudes, as suggested by existing
esults on bargaining under risk and heterogeneous preferences. On the other hand, individuals might differ in their risk
24 Results can be found in Table C.5 in the online Appendix.
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attitudes because they experienced conﬂicts in the past and consequently give each other a wide berth in the future. It may
also be possible that both causalities exist at the same time: differences in risk attitudes might lead to conﬂicts, and conﬂicts
might even strengthen differences in risk attitudes, generating segregation with respect to attitudes and a high frequency
of conﬂicts.
Our results are strongly driven by kinship dyads. Kinship links are exogenously determined and harder to break that
nonkin links. If conﬂict lead to differences in risk attitudes, through the breakage of social interaction, we  would not expect
it to be particularly driven by kinship links. Additionally, when we investigate whether conﬂict links are similar to links
among people who do not know each other, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences in the relationship to differences in risk attitudes.
This suggests that the relationship between conﬂict and heterogeneity in risk attitudes is not solely explained by the breakage
of social relationships.
8. Conclusion
This paper examines whether interpersonal conﬂict is related to differences in attitudes towards risk. We conduct a study
in rural Uganda, which consists of a social tie survey to identify links between village members, followed by an experiment
to elicit risk attitudes. Our sample covers nearly one thousand dyads of individuals and provides detailed information about
socio-economic characteristics as well as characteristics of social relationships. With the exception of only one dyad, all
village members know each other. Out of these existing links more than a ﬁfth, 21.5%, report interpersonal conﬂict.
We ﬁnd a persistent and signiﬁcant relationship between the presence of conﬂict links and differences in risk attitudes:
a larger difference is signiﬁcantly related to a higher likelihood of interpersonal conﬂict. Interestingly, this relationship is
particularly strong among kin, but not signiﬁcant for non-related village members. More precisely, for kin, a 1 unit increase
in the standard deviation of the difference in risk attitudes corresponds to almost a doubling of the odds ratio of conﬂict.
To extrapolate our analysis to links between individuals who  are very unlikely to know each other, we use a simulation
approach and randomly generate links across villages. If conﬂicts are likely to result in the severing of social ties, as a result
of which differences in risk attitudes might increase, we would expect risk attitudes to be similar across random and conﬂict
links. However, differences in risk attitudes are signiﬁcantly larger among conﬂict links. Consistent with our previous results
we ﬁnd that an increase in the difference in risk attitudes is related to a signiﬁcant increase in the likelihood of conﬂict links,
relative to the likelihood of a link between individuals who  do not know each other (as measured by random links). Moreover,
we do not ﬁnd any evidence that risk attitudes per se are correlated to interpersonal conﬂict.
An important novelty of this paper is our focus on negative interpersonal links, conﬂict, instead of positive relationships,
such as friendship. In that sense, our paper provides the ﬁrst evidence which relates differences in individual attitudes to
risk to interpersonal conﬂict. Our evidence suggests that among individuals who  frequently make joint economic decisions,
kin, the likelihood of conﬂict increases with differences in their risk attitudes. Examining which particular types of conﬂict
relate to differences in attitudes towards risk, and how these could potentially be prevented, will be an important step for
future research. Our results explicitly show how fragile interpersonal relationships might be under heterogeneity in risk
attitudes.
Appendix. Supplementary data and analyses
Supplementary data and analyses associated with this article can be found, in the online Appendix, at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.03.003.
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